The Fault-Tolerance Latency (FTL) de ned as the time required by all sequential steps taken to recover from an error is important to the design and evaluation of fault-tolerant computers used in safety-critical real-time control systems. To meet timing constraints or avoid dynamic failure, the latency of any fault-handling policy | that consists of several stages like error detection, fault location and recovery | must not be larger than the Application Required Latency (ARL), which depends upon the controlled process under consideration and its operating environment.
Introduction
Most real-time control systems have been realized with digital computers due mainly to the increasing capability and popularity of digital computers and both the high-performance and stringent-reliability requirements of real-time applications such as aircraft, nuclear reactors, and utility monitoring & control. Since failure of the controller computers in such applications may lead to catastrophe, e.g., loss of human lives or economic disaster, these computers must be equipped with appropriate fault-tolerance mechanisms which guarantee the safe operation of the system even in the presence of controller-component failures. A real-time controller computer may fail because of not responding fast enough or because of massive H/W or S/W component failures. In other words, a real-time computing system is required to deliver the expected services in a timely manner even in the presence of component failures. Thus, the requirement of a controller's fault-tolerance must be considered simultaneously with the timing constraints of the corresponding controlled process.
Fault-tolerance is achieved via temporal and/or spatial redundancy, and hence, its design methodologies are characterized by the tradeo between these two types of redundancy. Most design criteria in non real-time systems deal with optimization of spatial redundancy, whereas in real-time systems time is so valuable to trade space for time. A fault-tolerance policy should be selected and implemented to recover completely from faults/failures within the time limit (deadline) of the underlying controlled process. We de ne Fault-Tolerance Latency (FTL) as the total time spent on such sequential fault-handling stages as error detection, fault location, system recon guration, and recovery of the contaminated application program.
Most work on fault-tolerance used simple models for FTL, which was also represented in 17] as the sum of Mean Time To Detection (MTTD) and Mean Time To Repair (MTTR). Reliability or dependability models assumed the recovery time to have a certain probability distribution; if the recovery time follows an exponential (or general) distribution, the transition from error state to normal state is represented by the mean rate in a Markov model (or a semi-Markov model). In 12] , recovery procedures were represented by instantaneous probabilities which measure the e ectiveness of fault-/error-handling mechanisms while ignoring the time spent on the recovery procedures due to the sti ness existing between fault occurrence and recovery. The authors of 6] derived a distribution of system-recovery times by using a truncated normal distribution and a displaced exponential distribution, which captures general short periods of normal recovery and special long durations of rare abnormal recovery. This work was based on the recovery time data collected from various (experimental) sources.
Note, however, that none of the foregoing approaches have treated the recovery process as consisting of several sequential stages such as fault detection/isolation, system reconguration, and recovery of contaminated computations; instead, they treated the recovery process as one event lumping all the sequential stages to (i) derive a simple expression for the recovery-time distribution to be solved analytically or (ii) implement the general models of error-/failure-handling with simulations.
In 5, 10] , the experimental data/statistical methods (i.e., sampling and parameter-estimation methods) for characterizing the times of fault detection, system recon guration, and computation recovery were discussed based on hardware fault injections in the FaultTolerant Multiple Processor (FTMP). In 1, 13], the recovery times were estimated for a pooled-spare and N-modular redundant systems. The e ects of various fault-tolerance features on FTL were described there. However, the results were given in a speci c application context applying spatial redundancy only, and assumed that the time required for each stage of fault/error recovery is approximated to be in a deterministic range.
In this paper, we propose to evaluate FTL analytically, covering most, if not all, practical fault-tolerance mechanisms based on the tradeo between temporal and spatial redundancy. We rst investigate the times required for all individual fault-/error-handling stages. Then, we tailor these results appropriately to represent all possible fault-/error-handling scenarios or policies. (A policy/scenario is composed of sequential fault-/error-handling stages.) Our analysis is based on the assumption that the latencies of fault-handling stages are stochastic depending upon the random characteristics of fault/error detection (or a random error latency) and fault behaviors; the active duration of a fault a ects signi cantly the success/failure of a spatial-redundancy method (i.e., instruction retry or program rollback). Our results | that focus on a sequence of error-/failure-handling stages | can also be used in those well-developed reliability or dependability models 2, 4, 7] .
In Section 2, general fault-tolerance features are described by classifying fault-tolerance mechanisms and considering the tradeo between temporal and spatial redundancy. Section 3 examines the e ects on the FTL of individual fault-handling stages from the occurrence of an error to its recovery, and combines these results to evaluate the FTL of a general fault-handling policy covering all possible fault-handling stages. In Section 4 we argue for the importance of FTL information to the design and validation of fault-tolerant controller computers. We present there an example that selects an appropriate fault-handling policy based on the FTL information. The paper concludes with some remarks in Section 5.
Generic Fault-Tolerance Features
Computer system failures occur due to errors, which are deviations from the programspeci ed behaviors. An error is the manifestation of a fault resulting from component defects, environmental interferences, operator or design mistakes. It is desirable to select an appropriate policy so as to continue the program-speci ed functions even in the presence of faults.
Fault-tolerance is achieved via spatial and/or temporal redundancy, i.e., systematic and balanced selection of protective redundancy among hardware (additional components), software (special programs), and time (repetition of operations). Thus, design methodologies for fault-tolerant computers are characterized by the tradeo between spatial and temporal redundancy. Using these two types of redundancy, a fault-tolerant computer must go through as many as ten stages in response to the occurrence of an error, including fault location, fault con nement, fault masking, retry, rollback, diagnosis, recovery, restart, repair and reintegration. The design of fault-tolerant computers involves selection of an appropri-ate failure-handling policy that combines some or all of these stages.
Spatial redundancy is classi ed into two categories: static and dynamic. Static redundancy, also known as masking redundancy, can mask erroneous results without any delay as long as a majority of participant modules (processors or other H/W components) are nonfaulty. However, the associated spatial cost is high, e.g., three (four) modules are required to mask a non-Byzantine (Byzantine) failure in a TMR (QMR) system. The time overhead of managing redundant modules | for example, voting and synchronization | is also considerable for static redundancy. Dynamic redundancy is implemented with two sequential actions: fault/error detection and recovery of the contaminated computation. In distributed systems, upon detection of an error it is necessary to locate the faulty module before replacing it with a nonfaulty spare. Although this approach may be more exible and less expensive than static redundancy, its cost may still be high due to the possibility of hastily eliminating modules with transient faults 2 and it may also increase the recovery time because of its dependence on time-consuming fault-handling stages such as fault diagnosis, system recon guration, and resumption of execution.
To overcome the above disadvantages, temporal redundancy can be used by simply repeating or acknowledging machine operations at various levels: micro-operation/single instruction (retry), program segment (rollback), or the entire program (restart). In fact, one of these recovery schemes is also needed to resume program execution in case of dynamic redundancy. This temporal-redundancy method requires high coverage of fault/error detection so as to invoke the recovery action quickly. (The same is also required for dynamic redundancy.) The main advantages of using temporal redundancy are not only its low spatial cost but also its low recovery time for transient faults. However, the time spent for this method would have been wasted in case of permanent or long-lasting transient faults, which may increase the probability of dynamic failure.
The relations between the temporal and spatial redundancy required (and the associated redundancy-management overhead) are shown in Fig. 1 for several fault-tolerance mechanisms. In case of time-critical applications, an appropriate fault-tolerance mechanism can be found from the top left of Fig. 1, i. e., paying a small amount of temporal redundancy at the cost of spatial redundancy like N-modular redundancy. When the timing constraint imposed by the controlled process is not tight, we can save the cost of spatial redundancy by increasing temporal redundancy (i.e., a larger time for retry, rollback, or restart recovery), which enhances the system's ability in recovering from more transient faults before the faulty modules are replaced with spares. Increasing temporal redundancy, however, increases the possibility of missing task deadlines or dynamic failure.
Evaulation of Fault-Tolerance Latency
The recovery process that begins from the occurrence of an error consists of several stages, some of which depend on each other, and the FTL is de ned as the time spent for the entire recovery process. Thus, all the stages necessary to handle faults/failures upon occurrence of an error should be studied and their e ects on the FTL must be analyzed. In a speci c application context, the recovery times were estimated in 1, 13] by decomposing the fault recovery process into stages and analyzing the e ects of various faulttolerance features on the FTL. We also use a similar approach to the problem of evaluating the FTL, but for more general fault-tolerance strategies. For completeness, these approaches are summarized below.
FTLs of a Pooled-Spares System
In 13], the FTL was estimated for a pooled-spares system implemented in the Dynamic Recon guration Demonstration System (DRDS) Program. 3 Phase 1 of the DRDS Program is reported to have shown potential bene ts of the dynamic run-time recon guration implied by the pooled-spares approach, such as increased functional availability and exibility, higher reliability, and less complexity than classical N-modular redundancy.
This work includes the analysis of FTL and has indicated that the pooled-spares approach can be used for many contemporary applications. The FTL was estimated for the demonstration system and the near-future (5{10 years from today) systems under the as- 3 The DRDS Program is being developed to prove the feasibility of pooled spares for next generation weapon systems by Texas Instruments (TI) Incorporated under a contract from the Naval Air Warfare Center, Indianapolis, IN.
sumption that each fault-handling stage | fault detection/isolation, recon guration, and recovery | requires time within a deterministic range. In other words, (i) an upper bound of detection/isolation time was determined by using a fail-fast approach with health messages and the system is assumed to use a combination of continuous Built-In-Test (BIT), periodic BIT, and application-level detection/isolation methods, (ii) the recon guration times were actually measured on the demonstration system with cold backups for a speci c load of size 8K 16-bit words, and (iii) recovery of the application code was performed via application checkpointing and rollback, and the required time was approximated to be a single checkpoint period. The expected reduction of FTL in the next 5{10 years was also estimated by considering such improvement factors as throughput and memory capacities.
In another paper dealing with the pooled-spares system 1], various fault-tolerance techniques covering both software and hardware issues were addressed by focusing on their latencies. This work also analyzed the FTL in the pooled-spares system based on the results of the DRDS Program in 13], and included part of the fault-masking method of N-modular redundancy. Possible fault detection/isolation, recon guration, recovery, and fault-masking features were considered to examine their e ects on the FTL while considering the CPU speed and the relative rates of fault occurrences in individual components such as memory, I/O, buses, and processors.
Memory or data-path parity checking, error-correcting memory, checksum, reasonableness checks, health messages, data-type checks, watchdog timer, and periodic BIT were given as candidate fault detection/isolation mechanisms, while cold, warm, and hot spares were considered for classifying the system recon guration with the estimated data of the download and initialization delays depending upon the program size, bus speed, and CPU speed. Several characteristics of checkpointing such as consistency, independence, programmertransparency, and conversation were introduced with the methods of software re-execution and rollback, where the time required for this recovery procedure was assumed to be a single checkpoint period as in 13].
Finally, the examples to select appropriate fault-handling policies to meet the given FTL requirement were presented for the cases of using cold, warm, and hot spares, illustrating how the analysis of FTL is applied. Fig. 2 depicts all possible scenarios from an error occurrence to its recovery, covering static/dynamic redundancy, temporal-redundancy methods, and combinations thereof. Each path represents one fault-handling scenario which may occur as a result of selecting a fault-handling policy corresponding to the path and the success/fail result of the selected method, depending upon the fault behavior when a temporal-redundancy method is applied. For example, an unsuccessful retry implies another error detection, which may trigger a second retry or rollback or restart. As shown in Fig. 2 , fault-handing processes are classi ed by fault/error detection and recovery mechanisms.
The FTL of General Fault-Tolerance Mechanisms
First, we divide the fault-handing process into several stages, and evaluate the time spent on each individual stage of Fig. 2 . When a temporal-redundancy method such as retry or rollback is used upon detection of an error, we need such stages as fault diagnosis, system recon guration, and resumption of execution only after the temporal-redundancy method became unsuccessful in recovering from the fault. Whether the temporal-redundancy method is successful or not depends upon the policy used and the underlying fault behavior. Thus, we have to represent the e ects of certain stages on the FTL in probabilistic terms.
Fault/Error Detection Process
The time interval between the occurrence of a fault and the detection of an error caused by the fault is divided into two parts by the time of error occurrence: fault latency for the time interval from the fault occurrence to the error generation, and error latency for the time interval from the error generation to the error detection. The distribution of fault latency was estimated in 16] by using the Gamma and Weibull distributions. Since the FTL begins with the occurrence of an error, we are mainly interested in the error latency which depends upon the active duration of a fault and the underlying detection mechanism. Error detection mechanisms are classi ed into (i) signal-level detection mechanisms, (ii) function-level detection mechanisms, and (iii) periodic diagnostics.
Let t el and F el (t) be the error latency and its cumulative probability distribution, respectively. Several well-known pdf's, such as Weibull, Gamma, and lognormal distributions, were examined in 5] to model the error latency. If t i is the mean execution time of an instruction, F el ( t i ) 1 for a high-coverage signal-level detection mechanism. For a function-level detection mechanism, t el depends on the detection mechanism used and the executing task. The coverage of the function-level detection is generally lower than that of the signal-level detection (and signi cantly less than one), and its error latency is thus larger than the signal-level detection's. We will therefore use the mean error latency of the function-level detection which is much larger than the signal-level detection's for the examples presented in Section 4. Although the periodic diagnostic whose coverage depends on both its period and duration is also a popular method to locate faults, only the rst two types of detection mechanisms are considered in our analysis, because the results thus obtained can be extended to the case of periodic diagnostic.
Fault Masking (Static/Hybrid Redundancy)
This method lters out the e ects of faulty modules as long as the number of faulty modules is not larger than n?1 2 for n-modular redundancy. The method induces the time overhead of redundancy management such as synchronization and voting/interactive consistency techniques even in the absence of faults, which increases with the degree of redundancy 9]. Although the time required for this type of recovery is almost zero it induces high spatial costs; when the number of modules available is limited, this method is not as reliable as the dynamic-redundancy method 13] and must be equipped with separate detection and recovery mechanisms for ultra-reliable systems 3].
A hazardous environment, like the one resulting from EMI, will a ect the entire system and induce coincident, or common-source, faults in the multiple modules of an n-modular redundant system. If the number of faulty modules is larger than n?1 2 in such a harsh environment, then the recovery time, which also depends upon the adopted temporal-or spatial-redundancy method, is no longer negligible. We do not treat such a case because of the similarity of its recovery process to the case of dynamic redundancy.
Fault Diagnosis
When a function-level detection mechanism is used, upon detection of an error it is necessary to locate the faulty module 4 and/or to determine certain fault behaviors. Let t d and p d be the time spent for fault diagnosis and the probability of locating the faulty module (i.e., diagnostic coverage). Then, there is a tradeo between t d and p d , which is usually di cult to quantify. The accuracy of diagnosis, which increases with the diagnosis time, a ects greatly the results of the subsequent recovery and hence the FTL. Note that the time, t d , taken for diagnosis is likely to be deterministic, because it is usually programmed a priori. We assume that t d is su ciently large to locate faulty modules, that is, p d 1.
System Recon guration
When a fault is located and identi ed as a permanent fault, the faulty module must be isolated from the rest of the system by replacing it with a spare module or switching it 4 in distributed systems o without replacement (thus allowing for graceful degradation). This process is necessary for both dynamic and hybrid redundancy. Speci c hardware like the Con guration Control Unit (CCU) in FTMP 8], may be dedicated to handling system recon guration. This process (of using cold spares) generally consists of (i) switching power and bus connections, (ii) running built-in-test (BIT) on the selected spare module, (iii) loading programs and data, (iv) initializing the software. When warm spares are used, steps (i) and (ii) are not needed. The time taken for this process is also likely to be deterministic, which depends upon program size, system throughput, processor speed, and bus bandwidth. Let t r be the time spent for system recon guration. We assume that t r lies in a deterministic interval, t r1 t r t r2 , where t r1 and t r2 are determined by the type of recon guration and several other factors described above. In fact, these values can be determined experimentally as was done in 1, 13].
Retry
This is the simplest recovery method using temporal redundancy, which repeats the execution of a micro-operation or instruction. To be e ective, this method requires immediate error detection, i.e., almost perfect coverage of a signal-level detection mechanism yielding an error latency smaller than the execution time of a micro-operation or an instruction (F el ( t i ) 1). The retry period, which is de ned as a continuous-time interval or the number of re-executions, is the maximum allowable time for retry. In other words, a retry must be terminated when the retry period expires, regardless whether it is successful or not.
Let t rp , t a , and F a (t) be the retry period, the active duration of a fault, and the probability distribution of the active duration, respectively. The result of a retry depends upon t rp and t a . When the retry is successful, the time it took is certainly smaller than the retry period and is equal to the fault duration, t a . However, it is equal to the retry period, t rp , when the retry became unsuccessful, and an alternative recovery method will be followed, thus increasing the FTL.
Rollback with Checkpoints
The inquality t el > t i is allowed in this method, i.e., F el ( t i ) < 1. When an error is detected by a signal-or function-level detection mechanism, this method rolls back past the contaminated part of a program following a system recon guration in case of dynamic redundancy. It is invoked as the rst step of recovery after an unsuccessful retry. The time taken for the rollback process is dependent upon the error latency, the inter-checkpoint interval, the number of checkpoints maintained, and the way checkpoints are selected for rollback. Let t c and N c be the inter-checkpoint interval and the maximum number of checkpoints necessary for rollback recovery, respectively. For simplicity we assume that the inter-checkpoint intervals are simply equidistant. (It is not di cult to extend our method to the case of non equidistant checkpoints, though the notation will become more complex.) When the rollback is successful, the time taken to restore the contaminated segment of a program is larger than the error latency but smaller than the error latency plus one intercheckpoint interval; that is, equal to d tel tc e t c , where dxe is the smallest integer larger than x. If the fault is active during the entire period of rollback or the contaminated part is larger than the re-executed part of the program, the rollback recovery will fail and the corresponding \wasted" time is equal to N c t c .
Restart
If too much of the program is contaminated by an error due to a long error latency, its execution is repeated from the beginning. The time (computation loss) taken for the restart process depends upon (i) the time to detect an error and (ii) the types of restart (i.e., hot, warm, and cold restarts) following a system recon guration. We use t e and F e (t) to denote the error-detection time measured from the beginning of the program execution and the probability distribution of error occurrences in a program (determined by the pdf of fault occurrence), respectively.
Combination of Failure-Handling Stages
As mentioned earlier, all failure-handling scenarios are described by the paths from error detection to the corresponding recovery in Fig. 2 . It is clear that a fault-handling policy depends on several mutually exclusive events, where one event represents a scenario and its occurrence depends upon fault behaviors and the policy parameters. The probability of the occurrence of each event can thus be calculated by using the pdf of fault active duration (F a ) and the policy parameters such as t c , N c , or t rp . The FTL of a certain fault-handling policy is thus obtained by using the probabilities of all possible events/scenarios and the times spent for those events/scenarios. Note that the time spent for each scenario is obtained by adding the times spent for all fault-handling stages on the path representing the scenario. Likewise we can obtain the probability distribution of a fault-handling policy (F l ) as:
where S i indicates the i-th scenario of a fault-handling policy, and P(S i ) and n are the probability of the occurrence of S i and the number of all possible scenarios in the selected fault-handling policy, respectively. Eq. (3.1) describes F l (t) as a weighted sum of conditional distribution functions. Each S i 's conditional distribution function is computed by convolving the probability distribution functions of the times spent for all the stages on the corresponding path or fault-handling policy. The times spent for all possible fault-handling stages are described as deterministic values or random variables with certain probability distribution functions. We will investigate each fault-handling stage individually. Now, we characterize the fault-handling process into four policies according to the types of error-detection mechanisms and recovery methods combined with temporal and spatial redundancy; (i) restart after recon guration, (ii) rollback, (iii) retry, and (iv) retry then rollback. These cover all possible dynamic-and/or temporal-redundancy methods. Specifically, we can describe the fault-handling policies as follows. (Note that the number of all possible scenarios in each fault-handling policy is equal to n.) Policy 1 (n = 2): S 1 = successful restart after diagnosis and recon guration, S 2 = unsuccessful restart due to incorrect diagnosis then repeat.
Policy 2 (n = 2): S 1 = successful rollback after diagnosis, S 2 = unsuccessful rollback then restart after diagnosis and recon guration.
Policy 3 (n = 2): S 1 = successful retry, S 2 = unsuccessful retry then restart after recon guration.
Policy 4 (n = 3): S 1 = successful retry, S 2 = unsuccessful retry and successful rollback, S 3 = unsuccessful retry and unsuccessful rollback then restart after recon guration.
While signal-level detection mechanisms can capture the faulty module immediately upon occurrence of an error and can thus invoke retry in Policies 3 and 4, function-level detection mechanisms | that cause a nonzero error latency and thus require the diagnosis process to locate the faulty module | may be used for Policies 1 and 2. The probabilities of scenario occurrences and the (conditional) distribution functions of the above scenarios are derived by using the variables de ned earlier for individual fault-handling stages.
For simplicity, we do not consider the occurrence of an error/failure due to a second fault during the recovery from the rst fault. If we need to consider the e ects of such an error/failure, we cannot derive a closed-form distribution function of FTL, but can instead derive the moments of FTL by using recursive equations, which can then be used to derive the distribution function of FTL numerically.
Policy 1 is a simple form of dynamic redundancy, i.e., to restart the task from the beginning after identifying and replacing the faulty module with a nonfaulty spare. The rst scenario is a successful restart with correct diagnosis. Thus, the probability of its occurrence is equal to that of successful diagnosis (p d ), and the time (t l ) spent on this scenario becomes: t l = t el + t d + t r + t e ; where t d and t r are deterministic variables, and t el is a random variable with the distribution function, F el . t e is also a random variable with a certain conditional distribution function given that an error had occurred during the execution of a task, i.e., F e (tjan error occurred). Let t = t l ? t d ? t r , then: P(S 1 ) = p d ; F l (tjS 1 ) = F el (t) F e (tjan error occurred):
Similarly, P(S 2 ) and F l (tjS 2 ) are derived for the second scenario. Since an unsuccessful restart (of the second scenario) wastes more time than the rst scenario by the amount of the incorrect{diagnosis time plus the (error) latency for a second error detection due to this incorrect diagnosis, t l is changed to: t l = t el + t d + t el + t d + t r + t e = 2t el + 2t d + t r + t e :
Let t = t l ? 2t d ? t r , then: P(S 2 ) = 1 ? p d ; F l (tjS 2 ) = F el ( t 2 ) F e (tjan error occurred):
Policies 2 and 3 use rollback with diagnosis and retry upon error detection, respectively. Recon guration is also called for if the temporal-redundancy approach became unsuccessful. Since the rst scenario of Policy 2 is a successful rollback, the probability of its occurrence depends on the probability of successful diagnosis (p d ), the parameters of rollback ( t c and N c ), the error latency (t el ), and the fault active duration (t a ). For a successful rollback, (i) a faulty module must be identi ed with correct diagnosis, (ii) t el must be smaller than N c t c , which is the maximum allowable time for rollback, and (iii) the fault must disappear within N c t c . Let p t be the percentage of transient faults, then: P(S 1 ) = p t p d F a (N c t c )F el (N c t c ):
The time spent for this case is simply obtained as:
where F m is a cumulative probability mass function for m = b tel tc c. The probability of the second scenario being exclusive of the rst one is equal to 1 ? P(S 1 ): P(S 2 ) = 1 ? p t p d F a (N c t c )F el (N c t c ):
The time spent for this scenario is increased to: t l = t el + t d + N c t c + t d + t r + t e = t el + 2t d + N c t c + t r + t e :
Let t = t l ? 2t d ? N c t c ? t r , then: F l (tjS 2 ) = F el (t) F e (tjan error occurred):
For Policy 3 which does not require fault diagnosis due to the assumed immediate and correct detection of errors with signal-level detection mechanisms, the probabilities of scenario occurrences and distribution functions are derived similarly to Policy 2. For a successful retry, the error must be detected before contaminating the result of executing the instruction that will be retried ( t i ) and the fault must become inactive within t rp , if the time spent is t el + t a . Thus, P(S 1 ) = p t F a (t rp )F el ( t i ); F l (tjS 1 ) = F el (t) F a (t):
When a retry is unsuccessful, the time spent for this becomes: t l = t el + t rp + t r + t e :
Let t = t l ? t rp ? t r , then: P(S 2 ) = 1 ? p t F a (t rp )F el ( t i ); F l (tjS 2 ) = F el (t) F e (tjan error occurred): (3.9) Policy 4 has three scenarios whose probabilities and distribution functions are obtained by combining those of Policies 2 and 3. The rst scenario is a successful retry, for which P(S 1 ) and F l (tjS 1 ) are equal to those of the rst scenario in Policy 3 (i.e., Eq. (3.8) ). The second scenario is a successful rollback following an unsuccessful retry. Thus, P(S 2 ) and F l (tjS 2 ) can be obtained by modifying Eqs. (3.4) and (3.5) (3.11) With these derived probabilities and conditional distribution functions, we can compute the probability distribution of FTL for each policy from Eq. (3.1).
Application of Fault-Tolerance Latency
A real-time control system is composed of a controlled process/plant, a controller computers, and an environment, all of which work synergistically. A control system does not generally fail instantaneously upon occurrence of a controller failure. Instead, for a certain duration the system stays in a safe/stable region or in the admissible state space even without updating the control input from the controller computer. However, a serious degradation of system performance or catastrophe called a dynamic failure (or system failure), occurs if the duration of missing the update (or incorrect update) of the control input due to malfunctioning of the controller computer exceeds a certain limit called the hard deadline 15]. The hard deadline represents system inertia/resilience against a dynamic failure, which can be derived experimentally or analytically using the state dynamic equations of the controlled process, the information on fault behaviors involving environmental characteristics (such as electro-magnetic interferences), and the control algorithms programmed in the controller computers 14].
When an error/failure occurs in a controller computer, the error must be recovered within a certain period, called the Application Required Latency (ARL) 13], in order to avoid a dynamic failure. Roark et al. 13 ] presented several empirical examples of ARL for ight control, missile guidance, air data system, automatic tracking and recognition applications. It is important to note that one can derive the ARL analytically using the hard-deadline information 14], because the sum of ARL and the minimum time to execute the remaining control task to generate a correct control input is equal to the system's hard deadline. Using this information about the ARL/deadline of the controlled process and the FTL of the controller computer, one can select (or design) an appropriate fault-handling policy by making a tradeo between temporal and spatial redundancy while satisfying the strict timing constraint, FTL ARL. One can also estimate the system's ability of meeting the timing constraint in the presence of controller-computer failures, which is characterized by the probability of no dynamic failure using the evaluated ARL and FTL.
We now present an example to demonstrate the usefulness of the evaluated FTL. Consider a pooled-spares system which consists of multiple modules connected to a backplane. The system consists of power supplies, input/output modules, and a set of identical data processing modules, a subset of which are assigned to processing tasks. The remaining modules can be used as spares in case of an error/failure. Let the basic time unit be one millisecond, and let the task execution time in the absence of error/failure and the mean execution time of one instruction be given as T = 50 (= 0:05sec) and t i = 0:002 (= 2 sec), respectively. The error latency is assumed to follow an exponential distribution with mean 12 and 0:002 for function-and signal-level detection mechanisms, respectively. The fault occurrence and duration are also governed by exponential distributions, where the mean value of active duration is 0:5, and the percentage of transient faults (p t ) is about 0:9. Then, given that an error occurred during T, the occurrence time, t e , is uniformly distributed over T. The diagnosis time, t d , is 50, which is assumed to yield coverage p d = 0:95. When cold spares are used, it is assumed to take 500 units of time for system recon guration. We also assume that this value can be reduced to 100 by using warm spares. When applying rollback recovery, we set t c = 5 and N c = 4, whereas the retry period, t rp , is set to 1.
Under these conditions, the probability distribution functions of FTL are evaluated for the four representative policies by using the method developed in Section 3. These functions are plotted in Fig. 3 . the mean values of FTL become smaller, but the upper bounds of FTL are not changed. Thus, we can draw the same conclusion as Fig. 3 in selecting an appropriate fault-handling policy.
We also consider di erent fault parameters: p t and the mean value of active duration are changed to 0:95 and 0:25, respectively. Since the temporal-redundancy approaches get better under such conditions, the FTLs of Policies 2, 3, and 4 cluster small values, as depicted in Fig. 5 . However, one cannot still neglect some possible FTLs larger than 10T, albeit with small probabilities.
When the hard deadline t hd is tight like t hd 10T(= 500), no policy can meet the timing constraint, FTL ARL. It is shown in Figs. 4 and 5 that the FTL does not change signi cantly even if the policy and/or fault parameters are changed. Considering the fact that recon guration is the most time-consuming among all the fault-handling stages, we use warm spares to reduce t r , which skews signi cantly the probability distribution functions of the FTLs to the right, as shown in Fig. 6 where all parameters but t r are the same as those in Fig. 3 . In that case, Policies 3 and 4 are suitable for systems with t hd > 4T(= 200). If the timing constraint is tighter, e.g., t hd 4T, we can conclude that static redundancy (or hot spares) must be used at the expense of spatial redundancy, since no policy using dynamic or temporal redundancy can satisfy the stringent constraint. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluated the FTL for general failure-handling policies that combine temporal and spatial redundancy. We investigated all the individual fault-handling stages from error detection to its complete recovery, and used some deterministic and random variables to model the times spent for these stages. This is in sharp contrast to the previous work that evaluated fault-recovery times with simple models or deterministic data collected from experiments. As shown in a simple example | although the parameters used in the example are chosen arbitrarily, their choice would not change the conclusion we have drawn | the evaluated FTL is a key to the selection of an appropriate fault-handling policy, especially for real-time controller computers.
Although we assumed the latencies of individual stages to be available by measuring or modeling relevant variables, it is in reality quite di cult to obtain their accurate values, some of which depend on each other and also on applications. We are currently investigating ways to evaluate or model the times spent on the individual stages while considering the system architecture, task type, and the implementation of each stage.
There are also several interesting related problems worth further investigation, including:
Although it is not always required (because of, for example, a successful temporalredundancy method like retry), system recon guration is generally the most timeconsuming stage of fault-/error-handling. We are currently analyzing the latency of system recon guration, examining all of its features: (i) cold, warm, and hot spares, (ii) active or passive recon guration (and graceful degradation), (iii) complexity of switching and initiated built-in-testing of a spare, (iv) the tradeo between computational capacity and system reliability associated with each recon guration strategy.
It is important to derive, if possible, a closed-form pdf expression for the time spent for each individual stage. In case an exact closed-form pdf is not obtainable, an approximate expression may be used to determine an appropriate fault-/error-handling policy.
The FTL strongly depends upon fault coverage, which was assumed to be a constant determined by the diagnosis stage. However, fault coverage is in reality not simple to determine due mainly to the e ects of many coupled testing/detecting methods. The task type and the failure occurrence rate also a ect fault coverage. When periodic diagnoses are used, there is a tradeo between accuracy (fault coverage) and time (frequency and diagnosis time). It is important to study all the factors determining fault coverage and analyze its e ects on the FTL.
